Federalist Papers #13-15

Sooooooooo I was sort of getting bored with these – but then when we got to #15, Hamilton was all "I bet you're getting bored with these, time to make 'em interesting again" and boy howdy did he deliver.

FEDERALIST No. 13. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

Alexander Hamilton tells us that one government is less expensive than thirteen governments.

He doesn't do any math on this; he just writes "Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or any number less than the whole" and hopes that we'll trust him.

FEDERALIST No. 14. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered

James Madison explains what a republic is.

"It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region."

FEDERALIST No. 15. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

I have no idea how excited Alexander Hamilton was to write this essay, but it seems as if he could not wait to get the words down, and many of those words are in ALL CAPS.

He starts by reassuring us that the next several essays will not be boring. We are on a quest for information together, and he is going to do his best to remove any obstacles that might get in our way!

If the road over which you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without sacrificing utility to despatch.

The first piece of information that he gives us is, shall we say, not good news.

We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation.

Oh, Hamilton. If you only knew.

That said, the national humiliation to which he is currently referring does sound a bit like our current situation, something something history rhymes, prices are going up, people are taking out lines of credit not because they want to build things and/or start businesses but because they're uncertain about the future, commerce is deteriorating into capitalism (remember that commerce = fair trade and capitalism = unfair trade), we owe money to other nations, we're having trouble trading with other nations, and our ambassadors are "the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty."

The only way out of this humiliation, Hamilton explains, is by empowering a strong central government.

It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. 

Then the essay starts to get really interesting.

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist.

Agreed, Hamilton. Individual rights should supersede corporate and/or collective rights, and states should not exist for the benefit of the corporation.

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head, there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and which is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.

Agreed again – but can you expand that explanation?

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.

This is a brilliant explanation, thank you – but what about the people who say we can live both happily and prudently without a government? What would you say to the Future Libertarians of America?

Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a private capacity.

Yep, that tracks – but can you give us one more reason why it has to be a strong central government and not a confederation of small state governments held together by a United Nations-style agreement?

In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature.

The Constitution, in other words, was designed to protect us from the weaknesses in our own constitutions.

I never understood that before.

Thank you, A. Ham.